Democracy, Populism, and Political Identity: a brief essay of the actual political context in Brazil and threats to the Brazilian 2022 elections

Democracia, populismo e identidade política: um breve ensaio sobre o contexto político atual no Brasil e as ameaças às eleições brasileiras de 2022

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ABSTRACT
Brazil lives a challenging moment due to a political crisis, which has started in 2016 with the ex-President Dilma’s impeachment, aggravated by the problem in the public health system in reason of unsuccessful measures of our political representatives, mainly President Jair Bolsonaro, in the fight against the pandemic of Covid-19. This political crisis harms the "newbie" Brazilian democracy; populism is at its center. The struggles by power carried out by the varieties of political identities have been determinant factors. Brazil does not get out of this spiral of problems in which it is involved. The interaction of democracy, populism, and political identity has an essential role in the current constitutional period, which is installed after the Brazilian military regime (1964-1984), because, despite being a "country" with more than 500 years, Brazil is still searching for itself inside and out of its frontiers. Thus, to understand the Brazilian current political context, it is necessary to analyse it from different cracks: this unpretentious essay tries to do so.

Keywords: Brazil, Democracy, Populism, Political Identity, Bolsonaro, Covid-19.

RESUMO
O Brasil vive um momento desafiador devido a uma crise política, que começou em 2016 com o impeachment da ex-Presidente Dilma, agravado pelo problema no sistema de saúde pública em razão das medidas mal sucedidas de nossos representantes políticos, principalmente do Presidente Jair Bolsonaro, na luta contra a pandemia de Covid-19. Esta crise política prejudica a "novata" democracia brasileira; o populismo está em seu centro. As lutas pelo poder levadas a cabo pelas variedades de identidades políticas têm sido fatores determinantes. O Brasil não sai desta espiral de problemas em que está envolvido. A interação entre democracia, populismo e identidade política tem um papel essencial no atual período constitucional, que se instala após o regime militar brasileiro (1964-1984), pois, apesar de ser um "país" com mais de 500 anos, o Brasil ainda está procurando a si mesmo dentro e fora de suas fronteiras. Assim, para entender o atual contexto político brasileiro, é necessário analisá-lo a partir de diferentes fendas: este ensaio despretensioso tenta fazê-lo.
Palavras-chave: Brasil, Democracia, Populismo, Identidade Política, Bolsonaro, Covid-19

1 INTRODUCTION

As a regular (and ‘good’) Latin American country, Brazil has much to do with populism, either leftist or rightist. In our history, democracy is an exception. During the last 33 years, our Republic passes through its longest time of democracy, but there have been successive attempts to subvert it. Our current President, Mr. Jair Bolsonaro, during the pandemic of Covid-19, has publicly supported anti-democratic movements, which claimed against the democratic institutions, such as the Supreme Court of Brazil and the Parliament, and demanded military intervention that ought to made by the President himself1.

Bolsonaro unleashes passions. Despite the peculiar ignorance of public machinery matters, such as the simplest mechanisms for the government's institutional bureaucracy functioning, his talkative, courageous, lying, and debauched ways cause controversial feelings in the Brazilian people. There is no way to be indifferent to Jair Bolsonaro. He strictly follows the “handbook” of his main idol Donald Trump, of whom he has almost visceral idolatry, although (and thankfully) unrequited. Their motto is never boring. The political space, for Bolsonaro, is a spectacle locus, in the best style of Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle. In this space, he looks at an opportunity to show how good he thinks he is for Brazil and how much Brazil “needs” him. However, he is not that good. He was a Federal Deputy for 24 years, with no bills approved; he was expelled from the Army for lousy conduct; his family is involved up to the neck with corruption. Bolsonaro is undisciplined and indifferent. He makes this his mark in politics, leading out tens of thousands of Brazilians to indiscipline themselves against democratic institutions in the public sphere and be indifferent to the others in the private sphere.

Through social media, Bolsonaro speaks directly to his audience. He has no official spokesperson. Every Thursday, he performs a live on his YouTube channel, to "be held accountable", gives instructions to his activists and attacks the media and opponents. He won the 2018 Presidential elections with a moralizing speech, combating corruption and opening up to neoliberalism. To date, none of these agendas have

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succeeded. What is seen is a politician desperately chasing his re-election, even if, for that, he must make alliances with corrupt politicians, as, indeed, he does.

Bolsonaro’s administration during the Covid-19 pandemic is disastrous. Even with more than 310 thousand deaths, the President, who had already affirmed that Covid-19 was just a “little flu”,² insists on denying the scale of the problem and failing to take important measures to fight the disease, as discouraging the population to get vaccinated.

The populism that supports Bolsonaro is based on demagogue speech against corruption and for the moralization of public administration. But what one sees are successive measures to perpetuate his worldview in Brazil’s government, like armed militias, due to the liberalization of arms sales for ordinary people, and the destruction of popular councils that acted inside the government. Indeed, Bolsonaro is the representative of a movement against the identity of minorities, which has been started in the country in the last 16 years, with the arrival of the left-wing parties in the government. It is a conservative countermovement that attacks minority struggles for recognition, especially racial and gender recognition policies.

This countermovement or popular backlash is characteristic of conserved wings of the politics of each country. Afraid of losing the political power which they have always had, conservative groups are opposed to policies to recognize minorities. For instance, in the USA context, Amy Chua notes that white people can become a minority in their country, which has encouraged the emergence of reactionary groups against social and identity policies, remarkably opposite to blacks and immigrants. This social phenomenon is inserted in a wide context, which can be noted as the tribalization of modern society. “When groups feel threatened, they retreat into tribalism. When groups feel mistreated and disrespected, they close ranks and become more insular, more defensive, more punitive, more us-versus-them”.³ The main feature of today’s right-wing political tribalism is the idea of whites as an endangered, discriminated-against group. “When blacks blame today’s whites for slavery or ask for reparations, many white Americans feel as though they are being attacked for the sins of other generations”.⁴ Not for any other reason, with Barack Obama’s election, right-far wing groups and organizations came out of the shadows and took Trump to power. These groups, responsible for the Capitol invasion, for instance, sometimes through rhetorical

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³ Chua, 2018, p. 1
⁴ Chua, 2018, p. 5
preliminaries, other times by explicit acts, have a close relation with fascist ideology, which, among other characteristics, has a particular interest in the struggle against the "other," who takes away the purity of its people⁵.

2 DEMOCRACY

In “How democracies die”, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt argue that we are in a historic quarter marked by a process of democratic retrocession in which the bars of protection of democracies are being eroded paradoxically by the democratic mechanisms of the democracy system itself. The intimidation of the free press, the treatment of the political adversary as an enemy and military power and coercion are tragic examples of how democracy is subtly degenerated. This corrosive process of democracy, felt among us, here in Brazil, and in dozens of countries in the Western world, has much to do with the relationship between the new social demands which are arising from the intense and complex human relations developed in an increasingly complex, diverse, and plural public sphere.

As results of this corrosive process of democracies, we can note the antiliberal populism, which, besides being a mere social discourse, is modernly characterized by specific strategies of direct communication with the electoral, oriented towards a certain political intention (common enemy - political party, minorities and immigrants, for example - disbelief in institutions and military demonstration of power), in addition to propagating an ideology that denies the democratic bases predetermined in the constitution.

This type of political ideology undermines the stability of democracy and aims at an “empty democracy”, insofar as they erode democratic constitutional rules, especially when the results of democratic elections are not accepted, and the public defense of anti-pluralist forces is highlighted. That is, for antiliberal populism, as Trump, Putin, Erdogan, Maduro, and Bolsonaro, there is only one right path and one truth. Generally, this populism has an individual and charismatic character; according to Zygmunt Bauman, it is the strongman, which is nothing more than “a ghost that haunts the lands of democracy”⁶.

Recently, in the USA, we have an example of how populism can be destructive for democratic institutions. The Capitol Invasion, which occurred on December 6th, was

⁵ Eco, 2018
⁶ Bauman, 2016, p. 47
a great example of how one of the greatest democracies in the world can be assaulted by a mob inspired by a populist leader, such as Donald Trump. The USA democratic institutions have responded energetically against the Capitol Invasion, and this institutional attitude allows us to evaluate how great a democracy is and how much it can support the assaults. Bolsonaro came out in defense of Trump and backed up allegations of fraud in the US elections, even without evidences. Bolsonaro constantly claims that the elections he won in 2018 were rigged, without presenting any evidence, because he should have won them with a much larger margin of votes. With the Capitol Invasion, Bolsonaro took the opportunity to affirm that if the 2022 Brazilian elections will "rigged", as well it would have happened in the USA, “we will have a bigger problem than the United States did”.

3 POLITICAL IDENTITY

Identity is a social construction; the "other" is a social construction, such as race, gender, immigrant. They are social constructions with a political aim, which is to provoke social fissures at the heart of society, allowing political power struggles. But these constructions are forged through intolerance, exclusion, hate discourse, and division.

This construction is not merely individual, but mainly social, like Herbert Blumer defends the collective process of being part of a "sense of social position," which results in the formation of an auto group image and the image of another group. When a group forms a picture of another group, it automatically forms its image. The "others" become "enemies," which must be eradicated; those can have their lives stripped of themselves, what Giorgio Agamben calls vita nua (bare life). So, "us" against "them" is a part of an ambitious political project.

In the academic field, the term identity has undergone different approaches. Erving Goffman, during the 1950s, was responsible for popularizing the notion of identity. In late 1960s, with the rise of the Black power movement, the identity claims have proliferated the identitarian claim-making. From mid-1970s to today, according to Brubaker and Cooper, the term identity is over-used, consequently there is devaluation of this meaning, which has resulted in a kind of “identity crisis”.

9 Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 3
In this sense, Brubaker and Cooper expose two groups of how one can gather "identity": "strong" and "weak" understandings. First, "strong conceptions of "identity" preserve the common-sense meaning of the term – the emphasis on sameness over time or across persons". They are used in most forms of identity politics and are “adopted for analytical purposes a category of everyday experience and political practice”. For these conceptions, identity is something all people and all groups have, or ought to have, or are searching for; there are notions like boundedness and homogeneity, and it is easier to separate who is inside (“us”) from who is outside (“them”) 10.

Second, “weak” understandings of “identity”, by contrast, break consciously with the everyday meaning of the term” 11. Constructivism conception arises in this "group", and it is as a way to "soften" essentialism, which "leaves us without a rationale for talking about 'identities at all and ill-equipped to examine the 'hard' dynamics and essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics"12. The problems with this understanding, for Brubaker and Cooper, are: 1) clichéd constructivism: due to its multiple, unstable, influx, contingent, fragmented conception; 2) “it is not clear why weak conceptions of 'identity' are conceptions of identity”, because the “everyday sense of 'identity' strongly suggests at least some self-sameness over time, some persistence, something that remains identical, the same, while other things are changing”; 3) these understandings “may be too weak to do useful theoretical work” 13.

Another way to deal with this question is to recognize that "political identity" is a collective political construction, which results in "a solid basis for political cohesion, collective action, and solidarity"14. Hence, “identity is key to understanding political behavior: it is understood as a non-instrumental motivation for social and political action that often operates in opposition to self-interest. Identities consist of an individual part (which is unique to each person) and a social or collective part (which is shared with others)”. Being part of a group leads to taking its characteristics and reinforcing the members' emotional role throughout the adhesion, fraternity, and/or pride. “Collective identities can take many forms. Individuals often consider themselves members of multiple groups.” And the intersectionality among these identities can be conflictive 15.

10 Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 10
11 Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 10
12 Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 1
13 Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 11
14 Brans et. all, 2017, p. 58
15 Brans et. all, 2017, p. 56
closer look reveals that the political identity concept has supplanted the order based on classes and national minorities. By that, each national legal system has chosen its forms for recognizing or stigmatizing the identities (affirmative action or reparations, for instance). This concept has provoked an increase in democratic representation: the more identities there is, the greater the diversity of representatives\textsuperscript{16}.

As Angela Davis said, democracy has to do with inclusion’s terms, not only with inclusion. In this way, democracy has a vital role in the inclusion of various political identities, which exist in society. Democracy is an openness to the "other" and a possibility of society's functioning through conflicts but without oppression. If it is so, political identities' plurality is only possible by democracy, and any attempt to destroy that plurality is an outrage against the public liberty and material equality.

Nevertheless, mainly due to new forms of interaction and communication (social media, for instance), political identity can reflect one person's lifestyle. For example, they are painting the house with their political party's colors or image, placing the politician's photo on social networks, carrying out political activism among family members at leisure time, etc. Meantime, given the complexity of reality, people have an impression of reaching the limit of possibilities to continue to express their identities\textsuperscript{17}. And it will be the popular leader who will take identity manifestations a step further, bringing together a tiny plurality that often tends to end some of the diversity.

4 POPULISM

Populism is a polysemic term, which can be used to set many political conditions. However, there is a common trait in all types of populism: the presence of a human figure representing a vast and robust ideology (political, social, religious, etc.) and sentiments (hope, fear, security sensation, etc.). So, in these terms, most of the time, populism has to do with fundamentalism of any type, mainly political.

The causes of populism in each country are contingent. Nevertheless, globalization and technological changes seem to appear as two significant issues which feed populism in every country. As Dani Rodrik points out, “globalization shocks, often working through culture and identity, have played an important role in driving up support for populist movements, particularly of the right-wing kind”\textsuperscript{18}. These causes lead to

\textsuperscript{16} Kennedy, 2006, p. 67
\textsuperscript{17} Mbembe, 2018, p. 9
\textsuperscript{18} Rodrik, 2020, p. 2
insecurity economy, which seems to be the main factor, in the Western countries, to the political backlash. The battle “us” against “them” often relates to economic concerns, even if indirectly and imperceptibly to ordinary people.

Populism is a war against democracy and its institutions. In almost all of its manifestations, it can be positioned on the opposite side to democracy, although it arises from that one. Socrates has said that individuals own an innate tendency to follow a "strong man." And, through history, many leaders have proved this Socratic thesis. World leaders as Bolsonaro, Erdogan, Putin, Órban, Maduro have much to do with the process which carried out Hitler, Mussolini, and Chavéz, for instance, to the power. Those leaders belong to what we can call neofascism. As Jason Stanley puts it, historically, leaders as such came to power through democratic elections, always using rhetorical speeches to undermine individual liberties and democratic institutions, suppressing the democratic regime, and establishing tyranny or another type of authoritarian regime19.

Today, "big" ideas have lost their capacity to inspire. Meanwhile, social media have the capacity to spread "wrong" ideas. It is important to note that today populism has used social media to spread its ideas. Some call it tech populism. Trump has won the 2016 election with the support of Steven Bannon, political strategist, who worked as the White House’s chief strategist in the administration of the U.S. presidency over the first seven months of Trump’s term. Giuliano Da Empoli exemplifies Bannon as something like ingegnere del caos (chaos engineer), which act on social media spreading fake news, conspiracy theories, and negative emotions, to canalize the rage of the popular classes based on real economic and social issues for specific political aim, through a powerful communication machine, originally conceived for commercial purposes, and which has become the privileged tool for all those who want to multiply the chaos20. Brexit was the immeasurable instance of how social media can be used to spread out misinformation, fear, and insecurity with sharp and well-defined purpose21. But not only. Also, the 2016 USA elections and the 2018 Brazil elections were permeated by a range of fake news, misinformation, and attacks against democratic institutions.

Besides, nationalism plays an important role at the core of populism. Historically, nationalism has been distinguished by three dimensions: 1) nationalism as ethnic purity;

19 Stanley, 2018, p. 31
20 Da Empoli, 2019, p. 22
2) nationalism as fascist form; 3) nationalism as national independence\textsuperscript{22}. The political thought behind these three dimensions can vary according to the meaning which each society sets for each of them. That is, nations can be understood as something that innately exists and are unchanging (primordialism), or they are variable social constructions (constructivism)\textsuperscript{23}. Thus, "primordialism stresses the idea that the nation is not only a cultural community with its own traditions and customs but also an ethnic community that is connected by a shared origin". On other hand, "constructivism is the political concept that the nation “is not a naturally occurring community, but a political product of social developments during the rise of modernity, just like the modern state, for instance”; an “imagined community” as Benedict Anderson has stressed out. In these terms, nations are constructed by the political power\textsuperscript{24}.

Depending on the political conception behind the notion of nationalism (primordialism or constructivism), the struggle for political power will also be contingent according to the notion chosen. That is, the political power will use these concepts to guide their demands, which will result in the exclusion or inclusion of certain groups. When adopting primordialism, groups outside the "purity" of the nation will tend to be excluded or not be included; according to constructivism, due to its natural openness to social relations developed in the facticity, there will be a greater propensity to include other groups.

And it has much to do with democracy. For Michael Ignatieff, “historically, nationalism and democracy have gone hand in hand. Nationalism, after all, is the doctrine that a people have a right to rule themselves, and that sovereignty responses in them alone”\textsuperscript{25}. Notwithstanding, populism, as said above, has the capacity to face and undermine democracy using all types of narratives and ‘nationalism’ is one of them, and this can be harmful to a political and social viewpoint. As Michael Ignatieff has put out, in the political context, which has led Yugoslavia to ruins, through a manipulated plebiscitary democracy, that only ratifies one-man rule, nationalism offers the endless appeal of a politics of permanent illness, of eternal exaltation, which offers the glorious politics of identity and self-affirmation; rather than the interminable politics of interest and conciliation, there are enemies within and without to defeat\textsuperscript{26}.

\textsuperscript{22} Kennedy, 2006, pp. 47-48
\textsuperscript{23} Brans et. all, 2017, p. 59
\textsuperscript{24} Brans et. all, 2017, p. 60
\textsuperscript{25} Ignatieff, 1994, p. 25
\textsuperscript{26} Ignatieff, 1994, p. 54-55
Nationalism used rhetorically by a populist leader can be a powerful political weapon of the constating social construct of enemies, mainly through fear and hate. The social construct of the enemy is necessary to reinforce determinate political viewpoint and to gather people around a specific political aim. "Fear, more than conviction, made unwilling nationalists of ordinary people"27. Besides that, hate unites people. It touches in which afflicts them and promises a new life. Thereunto, the enemy must be defeated, that "other" which inflicts pain: destroying him is necessary. Populist leaders know how to handle the "other", through manipulation of ideals thrown in the public realm. All the guilty is of the enemy. The totalization of hatred is done by the spectacularism of the other, in the best style proposed by Guy Debord. "The society of fear and the society of hatred are mutually dependent"28. Populist regimes are liable to create popular engagement for taking the power, and then for maintaining it by anti-democratic arrangements; the fallacy of progressive government gives away to rigid controls and surveillance of the population. In other words, the populist leaders tend to over with the public realm, which is, as Hannah Arendt said, the space of appearance, where, through action and speech, the plurality of identities are engineered, carve, and framed.

In these terms, nationalism, as Luuc Brans et. al point out, is strongly related to the nation; and in this point resides the materialization of a political identity sedimented in the nationalism, which "is sometimes described as the effort of a group to achieve national self-determination"29. For Hegel, the State is the realization of the spirit (ethics) and performs the cultural and national identity. So, "nation-building can hardly be understood in isolation from state-building", and these types of construction can be top-down when the state intends to create nationalism to support it, or bottom-up when nationalism arises as a form of political identity and search a state for gathering its people30.

In Brazil, our political experience in the relation between nationalism and state was of type "top-down". Due to our territorial extension, to a lot of indigenous people living in that, and to the arrival of Europeans and Africans, the Brazil of sec. XVI to XIX was not a harmonic place nor there a political, social, or even cultural identity common trace between its population. Thus, the Brazilian government has abused military

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27 Ignatieff, 1994, p. 24
28 Han, 2018, p. 12
29 Brans et. all, 2017, p. 63-64
30 Brans et. all, 2017, p. 66
interventions in various points of Brazilian territory to stifle separatist and insurgent rebellions and to expel invaders from their lands. As an example, we can highlight the Dutch invasion in Brazilian northeastern, in 1624, which resulted in the so-called "Dutch Brazil" or also "New Holland" (1630-1654), when, in 1654, the Portuguese troops expelled the Dutch forces.31

The political rhetorical use of nationalism can be used to attack immigrants, for instance. In the USA, immigration, and as well as race, for instance, are especially important in the public debate. As Dani Rodrik notes that "the relationship between the presence of immigrants and support for populism is clearly a contingent one. Large metropolitan areas and highly diverse cities such as NYC and London with a large immigrant footprint are not where populists get their votes".32 Commonly, "less educated, socially conservative whites have had a lower propensity to migrate to urban areas. Meanwhile, globalization, technological change, and other economic trends have disproportionately benefited urban areas, in particular, mega-cities".33 This configuration, as the 2016 and 2020 elections show, has been reflected in the voters to each party of the USA. While two-thirds of whites without a college degree voted for Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden won more than 70 percent of voters between well-educated.34 Thus, we can see a strict relation between globalization, immigration, tribalism, and political backlash.

Meanwhile, in Brazil, race, criminality, and poverty are basically the main guidelines in the public arena. This is explained owing to Brazilian society's history. Immigration is not a huge problem yet, although there are some social and economic questions related to Bolivian, Venezuelan, Haitian immigrants. However, during the Covid-19 pandemic, President Bolsonaro, as well as some of his Ministers / Secretaries, including the Chancellor, and his children (three of his are parliamentarians!), have made constant attacks on China, relating the virus to a Chinese political desire for cultural and economic domination of the world.35 In one of his crude statements, Bolsonaro said he would not buy a vaccine that was made in China, just as he has publicly discredited the vaccine's effectiveness. A large part of the population, especially the poorest, assimilated

31 https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/news/2017/01/how-dutch-brazil-was-lost
32 Rodrik, 2020, p. 12
33 Rodrik, 2020, p. 18
34 Sandel, 2020, p. 101
36 https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/brazils-bolsonaro-rejects-chinese-vaccine-against-covid-19
this political discourse and began to attack xenophobically Chinese on the streets and on social networks, as well as they are refusing to get the vaccine.

5 CONCLUSION

Brazil is a country with low republican culture, and with a long tradition of personalist tradition, which is a treasure for political populist movements. Thus, it is not surprising that Bolsonaro came to power and that, even after another 310 thousand deaths by Covid-19, largely due to his poor management of the health crisis, he still has 30% of the electorate supporting him.

Bolsonaro has caught the fear of the economic recession, loss of jobs, and the resentment against corruption, and channeled them into authoritarian agendas, such as the indiscriminate permission to possess weapons, the proposal of the so-called "qualified immunity" (something like a "permission to kill "given to the forces of repression)\(^37\), the militarization of schools, actions against the rights of minorities, the intentional reduction of public policies to combat deforestation, among other measures. During the all pandemic period, he has discouraged the use of a mask by population (he rarely has used it), and provoked many agglomerations, he was against the vaccine against the Covid-19, although he had encouraged the use of hydroxychloroquine\(^38\).

Bolsonaro pretends to be a humble and simple person. Sneakily, he is always a playful person, with a joke on the tip of his tongue to throw out in the wind of political and social events, and acting like that he conquers the most reticent persons to progressive agendas. And thus, undermining democratic institutions, he deforms the young democracy in Brazil. The luck and bad luck of Brazilians is that Bolsonaro is incompetent in terms of administrative management. He knows little about public administration, economics, law, or finance. The economic recession after Covid-19 will be alarming, and Bolsonaro will not be able to do anything to reverse it.

Withal, Bolsonaro is a populist leader like Trump, although without the same political power in the arena public. Anyway, his populism is oriented against the plurality of society. He, personally, strives against the minorities (Black people, women, indigenous, homosexuals, immigrants, etc) and is a nostalgic defender of the military dictatorship just like the one established in 1964 here in Brazil. His political measures are

\(^37\) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-violence-idUSKBN1XV2J2
not inclusive; they are corrosive to the plural and tolerant public space. Bolsonaro's populism undermines the Brazilian democratic institutions and opens space for the capture of the government by the Armed Forces, perhaps more subtly than what happened with the 1964 military coup. His recent measures against Brazilian democracy are to sue someone, mainly political adversaries and journalists, who criticize him on the internet, or even some popular who manifest against his government, through a law enacted during the military dictatorship, called "National Security Law".  

It is not yet possible to know the concrete effects of his populist measures, because we are in the middle of the political turmoil that he got us into. In any case, only strong democratic and republican institutions can stop the abuses of populism. The United States has taught us a great lesson in resisting democratically, that is, within the order instituted collectively, to attack the Capitol. In Brazil, next year, there will be presidential elections and the expectation is that they will be as troubled as the American elections in 2020 when our political and judicial institutions will be tested at all.  

Finally, as one profile on Twitter of satire to President (@direitasiqueira) said: "When Bolsonaro assumed the government, Brazil was at the shores of the abyss, now, finally, we are walking forward."
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